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BOOK REVIEWS
THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND
SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS. By W. Paul Gormley. The Hague, Nether-
lands: Martinus Nijhoffi 1966. Pp. viii, 206. 27f.
International law or the law of nations must be defined as law
applicable to states in their mutual relations and to individuals in
their relations with states.1
-Philip Jessup
The major premise of Professor Gormley's book is that in order to
guarantee and to protect human rights which, of necessity, must include
economic and property interests, individuals must be capable of maintaining a
judicial action against any state which inflicts an injury upon them. To be
able to maintain any such action, then, one must possess the necessary
locus standi at the regional and at the international level. The minor premise
could well be formulated to state that even though this type of action is not
recognized under traditional concepts of international law, with the adoption
of the European Convention of Human Rights2 and the Establishing Treaty of
the Common Market, the individual has in fact-albeit in a rather limited
fashion-emerged as a proper subject of international law. The author's con-
clusion is simply that it is no longer proper to hold that only sovereign states
are procedural subjects of international law, although he does concede that
the individual does not presently enjoy the same standing as states.
Because of an ever-present and, indeed, expanding theory of absolute
state sovereignty together with the direct attempts by the member governments
of the Council of Europe and the European Economic Community to eliminate
any interference in their domestic jurisdictions, Professor Gormley holds the
opinion that he has selected a somewhat undesirable time for this work.3 Yet,
undaunted by this state of affairs, he feels that an emerging procedural person-
ality belonging to the individual is evident due to the use of supranational
institutions.4 Specifically, pursuant 'to the authority contained in the European
Convention of Human Rights and the treaty establishing the European
1. A Modern Law of Nations 17 (1950) (slightly altered for this publication).
Jessup feels that, as an object (rather than a beneficiary or full subject) of international
law the individual has no standing to bring suit in his own name for injuries sustained.
Id. at 16.
Brown, writing as early as 1924, acknowledged that international law applied only
between states and, consequently, the individual had no international rights. Editorial
Comment, The Individual and International Law, 18 Am. J. Intl L. 532 (1924).
2. The Convention was signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, and subsequently
became effective on September 3, 1953. It has been ratified by fifteen countries: Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
For a most illuminating approach to an understanding of the Convention, see Buergen-
thal, Comparative Study of Certain Due Process Requirements of the European Human
Rights Convention, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 18 (1966). See also Jessup, Transnational, Law
52-71 (1956) for a general consideration of the power of transnational law to deal effectively
with legal problems at the international level.
3. Preface at vi.
4. Ibid.
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Economic Community, courts of justice, along with administrative and political
organs, which are in turn held to be capable of effectively dealing with com-
plaints filed by individuals, have been established.
After reading an enlightening preface, the reader next encounters a list of
one hundred six abbreviations running the gamut from COMECON (Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance) to IMCO (International Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization) to WEL (Western European Union). One immediately
questions the need for this list in the first place. Most of the abbreviations are
well understood by those who have any level of familiarity in the area, while
others force the reader to refer constantly to these opening pages. This is only
a mechanical point of a stylistic nature, but the book would nonetheless have
been more sophisticated in its approach if, when reference was made in the
body of the book to various European organizations, their full names had been
written.5
Starting, then, with a brief consideration of the natural rights of men
as set within the broad context of international law, moving to the develop-
ment of his procedural remedies,7 the various claims commissions of the inter-
war period,8 arbitral tribunals and the role of the United Nations,9 discussion
of the Council of Europe and the various European economic organizations
concludes the book.10 Thoughtful observations are evidenced throughout.
There can be no question concerning the book's breadth of research.
Indeed, Professor Gormley is to be congratulated on his meticulous research
efforts. However, there is a serious weakness: that is, there is a lack of full,
in-depth footnote analysis. For the most part, the reader finds a series of
direct quotations and little attempt to synthesize various views." Perhaps it
was felt that the reader should draw his own conclusions. Whatever the idea
or purpose, this failure to achieve careful analysis, as well as synthesis, within
the footnotes is a serious weakness of the book.
The reviewer finds himself in general agreement with the astute observa-
tions maintained by Professor Gormley, namely:
First. That the United Nation's General Assembly should promulgate more
declarations creating limited obligations of member governments in the area of
human rights similar to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples.' 2 Although declarations of this nature ad-
5. E.g., P. 61: "Finally, we must not lose sight of the fact that the ILO (and to a
lesser degree other agencies such as UNESCO, WHO, FAO, ITU, UPU, etc.) function at







11. E.g., p. 58 n.53. In emphasizing the magnitude of the workings of the International
Labour Organization, instead of carefully examining the cases of importance it is stated
that such an examination would be unduly lengthy.
12. P. 15.
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mittedly do not possess legal force or have a binding quality, as does a multi-
lateral treaty, when declarations are unanimously passed, they thereby acquire
a position that lies between the mere codified declaration of ideals and a binding
convention.
18
Second. The International Labour Organization has made perhaps the
greatest inroad into traditional law and not only provided effective protection
to individuals but an indirect right of petition which actually amounts to a
right of direct petition at the international level. It would do well for other
organizations to emulate the Labour Organizations. 14 Indeed, the United Na-
tions, itself, must give the private party access to the highest international
tribunal-The International Court of Justice-if the world rule of law is to
become a reality.15
Third. The Council of Europe has, within a ten-year period of time, taken
significant strides in modifying the traditional object theory of international
law-and to this extent has exceeded the efforts of the League of Nations and
even the United Nations in the protecting human and economic rights,16 while
the European Economic Community seeks to guarantee economic and property
interests.
17
Fourth. The Commission on Human Rights and the International Court
of Justice must assume leadership in attempting to bring about a liberalization
of the procedural standards for individual petitioners, and at the same time
secure wider ratification of all important international documents by the mem-
bers without reservations.
8
This entire book reads more like an historical commentary than a hard
piece of traditional legal literature. But this is not meant to be necessarily
critical; the reviewer believes that the real purpose of the book is to be found
from a standpoint of historical overview. And it is for this reason, then, that
the reviewer disagrees with the Professor's reservation expressed in his prefa-
tory comments that this was not an auspicious moment for a study of the
procedural status of the individual before international and supranational
tribunals. While the present book is not an exacting definitive legal study, its





17. See Buergenthal, The Private Appeal Against Illegal State Activities in the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, 11 Am. J. Comp. L. 325, at 346-47 (1962):
[Tihe Treaty establishing the European Economic Community does not con-
template an appeal, whereby a private party may either directly or indirectly
contest the legality of acts or omissions of member States in the Community
Court. In fact, the E.E.C. Treaty takes great pains to prevent the possibility of
the indirect appeal available under the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty.... By leaving the power to contest illegal State activities exclusively to the
Community institutions and the member States, the E.E.C. Treaty has deprived
itself of the most effective guardian of Community legality: the private party.
18. P. 123.
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fully recognized once the emerging procedural personality of the individual is,
itself, realized and the book then serves as an invaluable legal chronicle.
GEORGE P. SMITH, II
Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor,
State University of New York at Buffalo,
School of Law
